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Abstract
The paper describes the process of capital accumulation subject to
the following characteristics: (i) convex returns to (human) capital;
(ii) the need to self finance the investment. This set up is applicable
to explain some peculiarities in arts, sports and science, inter alia, the
“Matthew effect” coined in Merton (1968) to explain why prominent
researchers get disproportional credit for their work. The potential
young artist’s (or sportsman’s or even scientist’s) optimal strategies
include quitting, or continuing and even expanding one’s human cap-
ital in a profession. Both outcomes are separated by a threshold level
in human capital. In addition, it can be optimal to stay in business
although consumption falls and stays at the subsistence level (we call
this outcome a “Sisyphus point”).
Keywords: Human capital accumulation, Growth, Convex returns,
Threshold, Matthew effect, Sisyphus point.
JEL Classification C61, E20, I24, I26, Z11.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a variation of the Ramsey model of optimal investment
with the following special features: convex returns to capital and convex
opportunity costs for investment. In addition, we impose the constraint of
no debt at any point in time and this set up allows for complex and interesting
dynamics including multiple equilibria separated by a threshold. One goal
of the proposed simple model is to show the possibility of a threshold of the
Sisyphus type, i.e., the optimality of an outcome at the boundary of zero
consumption, which simultaneously separates an interior equilibrium from
an attractor to the origin (quitting the business, art, sport, science etc.),
which explains, e.g., why a very high fraction of researchers have none or
very few publications with none or at best very few citations. Moreover,
this outcome leads to the mathematically interesting, and in the context
of intertemporal optimization in economics, (very) rare, necessary concern
about the normality of an optimal control problem, compare the example of
Halkin (1974) and El-Hodiri (1971).
However, this framework is not only of formal interest, but allows for a
number of interesting interpretations and moreover complex dynamics and
thresholds. The convex return addresses the earnings of an exceptional tal-
ent or prominent often coined the Matthew effect: “For to every one who
has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who has
not, even what he has will be taken away”, Matthew 25:29. This point was
first addressed by the sociologist Robert K. Merton (1968), the “father of the
economist”, in order to explain why eminent scientists get disproportionately
credit for their contributions, while relatively unknowns get disproportion-
ately little. A famous example from economics is the familiar Solow-Swan
model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956).1
Following Merton (1968), many studies have investigated this so-called
Matthew effect, both analytically and numerically, and it is empirically doc-
umented in many fields including less obvious ones like education (reading
and math). The Matthew effect holds most clearly in the arts, in the past
and even presently, in particular for painters, musicians and poets. Bask
and Bask (2015) argue that ‘the cumulative advantage is an intra-individual
while the Matthew effect is an inter-individual phenomenon and that this dif-
1For which Solow got all (and still gets most of) the credit (including a Nobel prize)
although Swan developed the model independently and published it around the same
time (but in a less prestigious journal).
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ference in phenomena has consequences for the modeling of socio-economic
processes and either ones are detected in data’. Since it is very difficult to
measure quality and thus precludes convincing empirical assessments of the
magnitude of status effects, Azoulay et al. (2013) address this problem by
examining the impact of a major status-conferring prize (becoming a Howard
Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) Investigator) that shifts actors’ positions
in a prestige ordering. They find only small and short lived evidence of a
post-appointment citation boost but prize winners are of (relatively) low sta-
tus gain. The review of Perc (2014) shows that the Matthew effect, labelled
as “the concept of preferential attachment”, is ubiquitous across social and
natural sciences and is related to the power law. It affects patterns of scien-
tific collaboration, the growth of socio-technical and biological networks, the
propagation of citations, scientific progress and impact, career longevity, the
evolution of the most common words and phrases, education, as well as many
other aspects of human culture. The recent prominence of the Matthew effect
is largely due to the rise of network science and the concept of preferential
attachment.
The paper starts with the model (section 2), which is then complemented
by economic interpretations (section 3) before its analysis, theoretical (sec-
tion 4) and numerical (section 5). The conclusions (section 6) and Appendix
finish the paper.
2 The Model
The goal is to develop a simple and economically meaningful model with
a steady state which is optimal but simultaneously separates the basins of
attractions between high and low equilibria, and which is characterized by
zero consumption. We call such a threshold one of the Sisyphus type (because
of continuing yet obtaining nothing). The presence of such a point creates
an attractor to the origin (i.e., quitting art, science, etc.), which explains
why such a high fraction of researchers have just 0 or 1 publications and 0 or
1 citation, to use the example from the motivating work of Merton (1968),
or many start a career in arts but end up in different professions (often as
teachers, e.g., for music or a particular instrument).
For this purpose, we propose the following variation of the Ramsey model
of maximizing intertemporal (using the constant discount rate r > 0) utility
(u) from consumption (c), amended for a stock effect v(k) (as, e.g., in Hof
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and Wirl (2008) who show that stock spillovers are crucial for thresholds
in concave set ups of the Ramsey model based on Barro and Sala-i Martin
(1995)),
max
∫ ∞
0
e−rt(u(c) + v(k)) dt.
Consumption is as in the Ramsey model, the difference between output f(k)
and investment (i),
c = f(k)− i.
The crucial deviation from the usual Ramsey set ups is the assumed convexity
of the production function, f ′ > 0 and f ′′ ≥ 0, which will be economically
justified below; Skiba (1978) and many follow ups, e.g., Brock and Dechert
(1985), consider convex-concave production functions. Capital accumulation
is as usual but with the twist that investments are subject to diminishing
returns, (α′′ > 0),
k˙ = i− α(i)− δk, k(0) = k0,
because too large investments are less effective in expanding the capital stock;
δ > 0 denotes the deprecation rate. Preceding the interpretations of the
model below and with reference to our own profession, purchasing a lot of
useful software (say Mathematica, MATLab, SPSS) and books (e.g., for this
paper, Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1995, works of other economists as well as
of sociologists including Merton) at once cannot all be put into effective use
immediately. That is, the speed of learning is limited due to constraints
in particular of time so that a piecemeal investment strategy will be more
effective turning investment into human capital.
In order to simplify as much possible and to allow for explicit, at least
numerical, calculations we assume linear and quadratic specifications leading
to the following model:
max
i(t)≥0
∫ ∞
0
e−rt((mk2 + bk − i) + hk) dt (1)
s.t. k˙ = i− ai2 − δk, k(0) = k0, k ≥ 0, (2)
c := mk2 + bk − i ≥ 0. (3)
This model looks similar to Hartl and Kort (2004) but has crucial differences:
(i) the adjustment costs associated with large investments appear in the state
equation instead of in the objective, (ii) that investment must be paid from
current revenues (no debt), and (iii) consumption must be non-negative. Last
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but not least, (iv), the Hartl and Kort model does not allow for the kind of
dynamics that we are interested and that seem crucial for many fields.
As mentioned, a crucial point of the paper is the existence of Sisyphus
points (ks), i.e., a level of (human) capital at which consumption turns zero
and therefore all initial conditions to the left of it must end up in the origin,
k → 0. More precisely, departing from the constraint, c ≥ 0, we can define
the maximal level of feasible investment,
i ≤ imax := mk2 + bk. (4)
Assuming in addition that capital does not decline and investing at the max-
imal level subject to c ≥ 0, yields a fourth order polynomial for k = 0 that
can be reduced to one of the order 3
ψ(k) := (b− d+mk − ak(b+mk)2) = 0 (5)
since k = 0 is one of the roots. Or arguing differently, we can define also
the minimal investment imin that is necessary to avoid a decline in human
capital. More precisely, k˙ ≥ 0, iff
1 +
√
1− 4aδk
2a
≥ i ≥ imin := 1−
√
1− 4aδk
2a
. (6)
Definition The root ks > 0 at which
imax(ks) = i
min(ks) <
1
2a
is called a Sisyphus point. Therefore, k˙ < 0 inevitably for k ∈ (0, ks) since
imax(k) < imin (k), see Fig. 1 (and thus also for k ∈ (kmax,∞)).
Fig. 1 plots the crucial terms, imin and imax with their intersection de-
termining ks (also magnified). The dashed line shows the larger root of the
equation k˙ = 0 (the term on the left hand side of (6)) with i > 1
2a
, which
is irrelevant. The reason is that gross capital formation is declining for too
large investments and thus dominated by investments,
i ≤ 1
2a
= arg
i
max i− ai2. (7)
Therefore, no solution with i ≥ 1/ (2a) can be a candidate for maximizing
(1) even if it satisfied the first order optimality conditions. As a consequence,
kmax =
1
4aδ
, (8)
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Figure 1: Sketch of the curves imin(k) and imax(k). Only the area k > ks is
feasible for internal solutions. The enlargement shows the neighborhood of the
Sisyphus point for the reference parameters in (16) and (m, δ) = (0.3, 0.2).
defines the maximum accumulation of the capital stock (see Fig. 1).
The existence of ks > 0 follows easily by considering numerical examples
as well as from the limiting case of small a so that the quadratic term ai2
can be neglected. A necessary (and sufficient) condition for ks > 0 is that
dimax
dk
<
dimin
dk
at k = 0,
which implies
b < δ. (9)
Therefore, inequality (9) is assumed in the following. Interesting are the
cases in which a steady state k∞ exists such that
0 < ks < k∞ < kmax.
Application of the implicit function theorem to
mk2 + bk − 1−
√
1− 4aδk
2a
= 0
mk2 + bk − a
2
(
mk2 + bk
)2 − δk = 0
6
implies that a larger value of the parameter m leads to a decline of the
Sisyphus point and to an increase in kmax and thus to an expansion of the
area ks < k < k
max in both directions. This leads to the conjecture that k∞
increases w.r.t. m too but this requires further analysis.
By definition, the Sisyphus point ks is at the intersection of the two
curves imax(k) and imin(k) and thus at the intersection of the two constraints
i ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0. Any trajectory passing through ks implies i˙ ≤ 0 to its
left while both i˙ ≥ 0 and i˙ < 0 are possible to its right. Since k = 0 is
always a feasible solution, some optimal trajectories can pass the Sisyphus
point on their way to k = 0. Another property of the Sisyphus point is that
it can be optimal to stay there forever. This is the standard outcome for
thresholds in concave optimization problems (compare Wirl and Feichtinger,
2005) but almost entirely ignored in dynamic optimization problems with
convex-concave objectives (Hartl et al., 2004, draw attention to the possibility
of a continuous policy function although the Hamiltonian is convex with
respect to the state). Although nothing is consumed at the Sisyphus point
(c = 0) since everything is invested (imin = imax, and must be to avoid the
decline, k → 0), the payoff (i.e., the integrand in (1)) can be positive, if it
includes a direct benefit from the state (hk). Therefore, if h > 0, then the
Sisyphus point can be optimal.
If an agent has no access to credit in order to expand his human capital
starting at ks or below, it will eventually converge to zero. That is, all initial
conditions, 0 < k(0) < ks, must end up in the origin. Contrary to usual
thresholds, this attraction of the origin applies not only to optimal but to all
feasible paths. This suggests an analogy to what is called in physics a ‘black
hole’, because there is no way to avoid this limiting outcome (k → 0) once
the ‘horizon’ ks > 0 is crossed to the left given the constraints that the agent
faces. On the other hand, trajectories that expand human capital can and
do exist in the right hand side neighborhood of the Sisyphus point (but need
not be optimal).
3 Economic interpretations
Although the model is so far introduced only formally, it captures features
that are crucial in different fields in which individual talents matter that
can lead to a very unequal distribution of incomes. Familiar examples are:
sports, arts and also science according to Merton (1968). The evaluation
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of performance is most objective in sports but highly subjective in arts and
thus depends on luck, advertising and access (to media, markets, compare
Yegorov et al., 2016). The situation in science is presumably in between.
A crucial observation in all those examples (explained in more detail
below) is that the individual reward is linear in own human capital (k) but
convex in prominence or fame, i.e., relative to the competitors in a particular
field. We assume for simplicity that the reward per unit of human capital is
affine,
m˜
k
K
+ b,
in which b describes the individual productivity per unit individual human
capital and the first term accounts for the increasing returns due to promi-
nence, fame etc.. More precisely, the relative position of individual human
capital (talent, ability, visibility, etc.) matters with respect to a reference
point denoted by K. For example, K describes the average over all other
actors active in a field and is thus exogenously given at the individual level.
Treating K as a constant (the extension for a competitive equilibrium of
agents having different abilities and starting from different initial conditions
is left for future research), we define a reward coefficient,
ρ(k) := mk + b, m :=
m˜
K
> 0, δ > b > 0 (10)
and obtain linear quadratic revenues (y) with respect to individual human
capital,
y(k) = kρ(k) = mk2 + bk,
as stipulated in (1). In traditional industries, m = 0, yet m > 0 in branches
in which recognition, talent, prominence etc. lead to excessive returns. The
additional payoff term, hk, accounts for individual satisfaction from acquiring
a certain status of human capital (whether absolute or relative does not
matter given our assumption about K).
For a given population of sportsmen, artists, scientists or small businesses,
with the same initial human capital k(0) but different m˜ (or respectively,
m), their personal Sisyphus points and long run attainments will differ. As a
consequence, some of them will have to leave the market (those with low m
and k(0)), while others with the same (or higher)m and k(0) > ks will persist.
Therefore, success is unevenly distributed leading to a kind of Matthew effect.
The assumption of no debt at any point in time accounts for the uncer-
tainties banks face about the skills of an applicant (e.g., a young painter
8
asking for credit to travel to and learn from a famous master or academy).
Therefore they do not offer credit, or it becomes prohibitively expensive.
High bankruptcy rates characteristic for certain kinds of business provide
another reason for credit restrictions.
3.1 Science
We start with science as our first example due to the original and stimulating
work of Merton (1968) who coins and relates the Matthew effect to cumu-
lative advantage: Eminent scientists get disproportionately credit for their
contributions to science, while relatively unknown ones get disproportion-
ately little. Stephan (1996) notes that compensation in science consists of
two parts: one is paid regardless of an individual’s success, the other (includ-
ing prestige, journalistic citations, paid speaking invitations, and other such
reward) reflects the contribution to science.Therefore, the recognition for sci-
entific work is skewed in favor of established scientists and additional factors
reinforce the process of cumulative advantage: differences in individual capa-
bilities, inequality in access to resources, inequality of peer recognition, and
inequality of scientific productivity.
k describes in our notation scientific human capital of an individual re-
searcher, the only production factor. ρ(k) denotes the scientific recognition
of a particular piece of work accounting for the non-linear Matthew or recog-
nition effect. The reward (y) can be used for consumption c and investment
i. The additional term (hk) accounts how a researcher values own achieve-
ments irrespective of their public evaluation (compare Be´nabou and Tirole,
2006, for consequence of such intrinsic motives).
3.2 Sports
The Matthew effect is visible in many kinds of sports, because the winners
take a disproportionately large share of the pie (but not all because com-
petition is a conditio sine qua non for winning), monetary but even more
in terms of fame. Indeed, everyone knows the winner, say of the Tour de
France, but only few know the ones ending in second place except for the
time when Poulidor finished several times second. Sport provides also a good
example to link the individual Matthew effect with the aggregate. Consider-
ing individual talents for different kinds of sports, e.g., in Austria, entering
alpine skiing will face a fierce competition and thus a large K while entering
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a related field like ski jumping will allow one to face a lower K; of course,
payoffs are also larger in fields populated by many competitors (in the US
football or even baseball versus soccer). And sport is full of anecdotes, where
people invest their money to make it to the top: in skiing (the Kostelic sis-
ters were coached by their father), racing (Niki Lauda, three times World
Champion of Formula 1 racing, spent his own money in order to be able to
enter racing), tennis (from Steffi Graf to the Williams sisters, to give female
examples, were also coached by their fathers). And those who did not make
it quit (with many but unknown examples).
The examples from sports are not limited to individuals but include col-
lectives. Recently, The Economist (2020) reports about the unequal situation
between the Premier League and lower league professional football teams in
England. For example, Bury FC, just north of Manchester, was kicked out
of professional football after it failed to service its debt while nearby Manch-
ester City’s emirati owners generously paid the players’ salaries exceeding by
far the club’s revenues. Zoe¨ Hitchen, a fan of Bury, said, “The system ...
always lets people down at the bottom. It never lets down the people at the
top.”2
3.3 Art
Similar to sports, and maybe even larger, are the uneven returns in many
disciplines of arts. For an example, David Hockney earned in 2018 above
90 million dollars for a single painting, while many painters earn just a few
dollars for their work with a “value” in most cases for sure above 1/106 of
Hockney’s painting (Burroughs, 2018). Yet in May 2019 Jeff Koon’s sculpture
of a rabbit was bought for 91 million dollars (Kazakina, 2019). Moving back
in history a few handful of painters (e.g., Giotto, Du¨rer, da Vinci, Raffael,
..., Picasso, etc.) out of thousands if not millions account for a very large
share of the total value of all paintings; similarly for composers of which few
remain known and played. A further characteristic of arts, again in particular
for paintings, sculptures and related activities, is the public contribution
(directly or indirectly by publicly owned museums participating in auctions),
but also in other fields, e.g., paying for the superstars among opera singers
and conductors appearing publicly financed opera houses and concert halls
2However, UEFA expelled Manchester City from Europe’s football contests for the next
two years because of that.
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(the status quo for all big European houses).
Yegorov et al. (2016) present a model that addresses the specifics that
individual artists have different opportunities to access a market, because it
depends on cultural specifics (like language for writers, taste for the kind
of music for musicians and composers, also for paintings) that can affect an
artist’s career choices. This explains inter alia the skewed distribution of
authors, since writing in English offers immediate access to a much larger
market than, say, writing in Albanian.3
3.4 Other examples
As already mentioned, the returns to small business and even starts up can
be highly skewed and this return to prominence seems to be increasing due
to search engines like Google (the power law describes the distribution of
visits to homepages in many fields). Another topical application is to self-
employment in service sector in the era of digitization (e.g., as an Amazon
Turk). As industrial employment shrinks due to robotization, many people
move to service sector and may offer new and traditional types of services,
like yoga, eastern healing, massage, even writing articles and theses, etc.
Skills can at best be imperfectly observed (evaluation by others, but which
may mean little for one’s specific task) and demand grows via network. More
talent or only better advertising and/or initial luck can win more than the
normal return to one’s talent in a particular area. Then, the market re-
turn consists of two components, (i) proportional to skills, bk, and (ii) the
gained due to prominence and marketing (access and ability to work in social
networks). Let m measures those marketing skills compared to the average
(because if both rivals advertise equally, they have costs, but the return is
the same). Then for a homogeneous distribution of skills (m) the returns to
those skills will be disproportionately distributed and term mk2 captures the
induced revenues.
Drug dealing is another example that fits our crucial assumptions: It is
self financed (it is hard to get credit to finance one’s career) and the returns
are highly skewed (those at the top have a harem, luxury apartments and
sports cars, while those selling the drugs earn less than the minimum wage
(i.e., they stay at or close to what we call the Sisyphus point) and this in
3Nevertheless, Isaac Bashevis Singer received the Nobel prize for literature albeit writing
in Yiddish. However, he lived in New York and was readily translated.
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spite of their risk in the hope to move up, see Levitt and Venkatesh (2000).4
4 Optimality conditions
We define the (current value) Hamiltonian of the optimal control problem
(1) - (3),
H = λ0(mk
2 + (b+ h)k − i) + λ(i− ai2 − δk), (11)
and set, as is usual, λ0 = 1. However, we have to return to this implicit
assumption of normality when deriving the optimal paths, because the case
λ0 = 0 cannot be ruled out and the corresponding abnormal solutions are
derived in the Appendix. Maximizing the Hamiltonian (H) with respect to
the control and accounting for the constraints, c = mk2 + bk − i ≥ 0 and
i ≥ 0, yields,
i∗ =

mk2 + bk
λ−1
2aλ
0
⇔
λ−1
2aλ
> mk2 + bk
0 < λ−1
2aλ
< mk2 + bk
λ−1
2aλ
< 0
 . (12)
The other first order condition determines the evolution of the co-state (λ)
according to (13), which together with the state equation after substituting
the optimal control (14) yields the canonical equation system. This system
is given below for the interior solution of (12):
λ˙ = λ(r + δ)− 2mk − b− h (13)
k˙ =
λ− 1
2aλ
− a
(
λ− 1
2aλ
)2
− δk, (14)
Equating the time derivatives to zero, we get the following algebraic system
to determine the steady state(s) of the above dynamic system:
k =
λ(r + δ)− b− h
2m
,
k =
λ2 − 1
4δaλ2
.
4Tragler et al. (2001) analyze the intertemporal trade-off between the social costs of illicit
drug consumption and the expenditures for controlling the US-cocaine epidemics.
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The first equation defines a straight line in the (λ, k) plane with positive slope
and a root at λ = (b+h)/(r+ δ). The second function k(λ) has a singularity
at λ = 0 and two roots at λ = ±1. Equating the above two equations (and
thus eliminating k) we get the following cubic equation in λ characterizing
any steady state:
g(λ) := 4δa(r + δ)λ3 − λ2 ((2m+ 4δa(b+ h)) + 2m. (15)
Only the positive out of the three roots are of interest. Since all parameters
are positive, g → −∞ for λ → −∞, g → +∞ for λ → +∞. Furthermore,
g(0) = 2m > 0 is a local maximum and the other local extremum (a mini-
mum) is at λ > 0. Therefore, g(λ) must have one and only one negative root
and the remaining two roots must be either positive or a pair of conjugate
complex numbers.
5 Results
5.1 Bifurcation Diagrams
We fix the following parameters,
r = 0.03, a = 0.2, b = 0.1, h = 0.1, (16)
i.e., the subjective discount rate is 3% per annum, the adjustment cost pa-
rameter limits investment to i < 2.5, and the linear earning term and the
direct benefit parameter are both set at 0.1. Numerical means are necessary
because it is impossible to determine by analytical means first the steady
states and then which of the paths is optimal for a given initial condition,
which is not trivial. We derive the different cases by varying the Matthew
effect (m) and the rate of depreciation (δ).
Fig. 2 is a phase portrait of the canonical equations but shows the control,
investment i instead of the costate (λ) assuming m = 0.3 and δ = 0.2 in ad-
dition to the parameters in (16). The (unconstrained) system has a negative
and stable steady state which is irrelevant due to the constraint k ≥ 0 and
is replaced by the corner solution k → 0 as a possible longrun outcome. The
other two steady states are positive of which the lower one is a repelling spi-
ral (complex eigenvalues with positive real parts) and the third and largest
steady state is a saddle point. Fig. 2 shows the isoclines, i˙ = 0 and k˙ = 0,
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the stable manifold for the unconstrained problem in bold (its extension to
the left requires c < 0), the feasible set, c > 0, and how the impossibility of
getting credit (i.e., of non-negative consumption) affects the policy heading
towards the high steady state: in order to make up for the low but steeply
increasing investment along the boundary (c = 0), investment is then flat in
the interior along the saddle point path, which close to the maximum due
to the large Matthew effect. What this figure cannot tell us which of the
strategies, following the saddle point path to the high steady state or going
to the origin (or to somewhere else) is optimal and what for which initial
condition. All we know so far is that initial conditions k0 < ks must end up
at k = 0.
Figure 2: The vector field, the isoclines and the feasible zone c > 0 for
a rather low Sisyphus point and a large saddle point path, more precisely,
a = 0.2, b = 0.1, h = 0.1, r = 0.03, δ = 0.2 and m = 0.3. The path from
the Sisyphus point to the saddle point path (solid black) includes the corner
solution (c = 0) unless k0 is sufficiently large.
Fig. 3 shows how the positive steady states of (13) and (14) depend on
the parameter m measuring what we call the Matthew effect. Positive roots
of (15) require at least m > 0.02 . . . so that an enterprise with only weakly
convex returns but convex investment costs is doomed to fail. Of the two
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positive steady states the upper one is a saddle point with an asymptote of
k∞ → 6.25 for m → ∞. The lower one vanishes for large Matthew effects,
i.e., ks → 0 for m → ∞. The line between the two (positive) steady states
(in blue) shows at which capital stocks the constraint c ≥ 0 is binding, i.e.,
the Sisyphus point, ks, depending on m. Therefore, the lower steady state is
always in the infeasible domain c < 0. The Sisyphus line intersects the upper
steady state line in the area of corner equilibria.5 The gray curves refer to
steady states of the canonical system that do not correspond to equilibria of
the optimal solution (corresponding to the dominated part shown in Fig. 1
by the dashed curve). The colored curves refer to optimal longrun outcomes.
The determination of the optimal policy requires advanced numerical tech-
niques and we apply the methods sketched in Grass et al. (2008) and in Grass
(2012). For m < mbif (= the bifurcation value) only the origin is feasible
and thus optimal as the only long run outcome. The Sisyphus point appears
at m = mbif and the Sisyphus curve separates the interior outcomes (c ≥ 0
is not binding and identified in Fig. 3 by the blue curve) from the corner
solutions, k → 0. A magnification, shows the additional outcome of an inte-
rior equilibrium at which c = 0 is binding yet staying at the corresponding
Sisyphus point is optimal.
Fig. 4 shows the bifurcation diagram for δ and a pattern similar to the one
in Fig. 3: A high and (saddle point) stable steady state and a low steady state,
which is not only unstable but is located in the infeasible domain. Lowering
δ below b (here 0.1) leads to an increase of upper saddle.6 No positive roots
exist for too large depreciation rates, δ > 0.6, rendering again the origin
as the only possible longrun outcome. Fig. 4 includes also an identification
of the optimal policies conditional on the bifurcation parameter (δ) and the
initial condition (k = k0). For δ < 0.5063 and sufficiently large initial capital,
k0 > 2.149 . . ., the saddle point path heading towards the high steady state
is the optimal policy (indicated by the blue line). The enlargement shows
that for slightly larger depreciation rates and lower capital stocks, first the
boundary policy (c = 0 and k = ks, red) and then heading towards the origin
(k → 0, green) is optimal.
5The term ‘corner’ refers to the active constraint c = 0.
6The set of feasible saddles is not bounded for δ ≥ 0. Contrary to the case of Fig. 3. This
means that for a certain low depreciation the final outcome can be arbitrarily large.
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Figure 3: Bifurcation diagram with respect to m for (16) and δ = 0.2. The
gray curves denote equilibria of the canonical system, which do not corre-
spond to steady states of the optimal solution. Colored curves show equilibria
that are attractors of the optimal solution, where blue denotes saddles in
the interior of the control constraint, whereas for the red and green curves
the control constraint is active. The green curve depicts the Sisyphus point
and the red curve the equilibria with active constraint but not satisfying that
imin = imax. The dashed part of the green curve (better visible in the left
panel) corresponds to the normal case, see Prop. A2 and the solid part of the
green curve corresponds to the abnormal case, see Prop. A3 in appendix A.
5.2 The Optimal Strategies
Fig. 5a shows the optimal strategies in the (k, i) space for m = 0.05 (small
convexity, but the generic case) and all other parameters as in Fig. 3. There
are three possible longrun outcomes depending on the initial conditions. As
conjectured, sufficiently large initial endowments with human capital lead to
the high steady state as shown in the bifurcation diagram in Fig. 3. And
low initial capital requires one to leave the profession. However, if placed at
the Sisyphus point, then it is optimal to stay there forever! Two trajectories
emerging from the Sisyphus point ks ≈ 2.5 move either to k = 0 or to the
upper saddle point equilibrium (denoted k∞ ≈ 5.7). However, both strategies
start and move for quite some time and over a wide range of human capital
along the constraint c = 0 (shown in red) but end up very differently either
at the saddle point path (at least close to the steady state k∞ shown in blue)
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Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram w.r.t. δ for (16) and m = 0.3. The colors
indicate the optimal paths: convergence to the saddle point (blue), staying at
the Sisyphus point (red, only visible in the enlargement on the right hand side)
and converging to the origin (green, for all point below ks(δ), red dashed).
or at another border solution (i = 0 close to k = 0, in green). Fig. 5b shows
the value function V (k) for the same case highlighting the steep, actually
infinite, slope V ′ = ∞ at ks. This property is important from both an
economic (see the discussion in the following subsection) and a mathematical
point of view because of the violation of the assumption of normality, more
precisely, the usually to 1 normalized coefficient λ0 of the objective in the
Hamiltonian (11) turns 0 and the costate λ diverges to infinity. The details,
including the numerical treatment of the abnormal case, are given in the
Appendix. The Sisyphus point ks serves as a threshold that separates the
two attractors, k → 0 and k → k∞ > 0, and ensures continuity of the
control (investment) instead of the jump typically linked to such non-concave
dynamic optimization problems. Furthermore, even if starting to the right
hand side of the Sisyphus point and thus continuing with one’s profession,
then it is optimal to do so with minimal consumption (i.e., at the boundary,
c = 0) in order to invest the maximum possible subject to the impossibility
of getting credit.
Fig. 6 shows the structural changes. At m = 0.03, which is below the
case discussed above in Fig. 5, the optimal policy is to move to k = 0 (to
give up) for all initial conditions. An increase in the Matthew parameter to
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Figure 5: The generic optimal policy for (16) and (m, δ) = (0.05, 0.2). The
state space (panel a) is separated by a threshold at the Sisyphus point ks: to
the left, optimal solution converges to zero and to right it is optimal to move
to an interior equilibrium k∞. For k(0) = ks it is optimal to stay put. The
circles denote the equilibria and the color code refers to different (in)active
constraints: blue no constraint is active, red if c = 0 and green of i = 0.
Panel (b) shows the value function V (k).
m = 0.03527 leads to an emergence of Sisyphus point along the optimal path,
but it is then only passed on the way to the origin. Further increases of m
render the high steady state feasible, which coincides with the Sisyphus point
for m = 0.03531. That is, a positive steady state is optimal at least for initial
capital exceeding the Sisyphus point, k0 > ks, but still at the boundary, i.e.,
c = 0. Further increases of m move the higher steady state into the interior
allowing for c > 0 as shown in the example Fig. 5. Even larger Matthew
effects, such the value of m = 0.3 corresponding to the phase portrait in
Fig. 2, render the high steady state attracting over a much wider range of
initial conditions but may still require living at the boundary (see Fig. 2)
unless endowed with large human capital.
5.3 Economic Implications
The model and its simulations describe the returns to talents accounting for
individual accumulation of human capital and the possibility of (very) high
returns or none. It seems therefore applicable to arts and sports, and to some
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(a) m = 0.03, k −→ 0 is the only solution (b) m = 0.03527, the Sisyphus point ex-
ists and the only way is k −→ 0
(c) m = 0.03531, the Sisyphus point and
an interior equilbrium appear
Figure 6: Structural change in the (k, i) space for (16) and δ = 0.2 and
for m in the neighborhood of the lowest Sisyphus point (compare Fig. 3).
Circles refer to equilibria, the colors to the different (in)active constraints:
blue means no constraint is active, red indicates that the constraint c = 0 is
active and green i = 0 is active.
extent also to science.
1. There always exists an area of initial conditions, k0 ∈ [0, ks], for which
there is no possibility to grow. This explains first of all why most do not
enter particular fields of art, sport and science and why many of those
who enter give up. It also suggests the possible need for scholarships in
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order to foster young talents, artists, sportsmen and scientists, before
they can make a living from the market’s returns. If the duration of
the scholarship is too short until the applicant matures, he gives up
(actually, has to) and the talent is lost (over time). This implies that
the share of lost talents depends on competition in a sector and on
the availability of scholarships (public or private), which explains the
dominance of the former Socialist economies in particular when the
GDR (with a population less than a third) beat the FRG in terms of
medals at many Olympic games.
2. Even if a talent is able to surpass the Sisyphus point, the following
period is hard, because Fig. 5 and also Fig. 2 (for a different scenario)
suggest that all returns have to be invested (c = 0) at this stage for quite
some time. The reason is that the return to capital is very large in this
domain (actually infinite at the Sisyphus point). This ascent is followed
by a period of slow growth (blue line) towards the steady state along
which the agent can already enjoy the fruits of his work and talent.
The story of Martin Eden (by Jack London) explains this phenomenon
very well. Many of the impressionists did not become rich during their
creative time, only some and then afterwards. This explains also why
in the past many artists and scientists came from wealthy and often
noble families or depended on rich patrons or already famous men (e.g.,
Giotto on Cimabue) because of the need to self-finance the education.7
3. The bifurcation diagram w.r.t. depreciation δ in Fig. 4 implies: A very
low depreciation allows for unbounded growth (as in the AK-model
of Rebelo, 1991), while no other steady state than the boundary solu-
tion, k → 0, exists for high depreciation rates. This can explain the
Matthew phenomenon that only few become successful contrary to the
majority ending up with low productivity and no fame. Depreciation
depends not only on personal abilities but also on trends (in science)
and fashions (in arts, recall the fate of good naturalistic painters during
the 20th century) that can depreciate one’s particular kind of human
capital. While in some fields (e.g., in some branches of mathematics) it
is possible to use old knowledge, the need for particular skills changes
very rapidly in others, for example, in informatics (people are forced
7De Vereaux (2018) suggests that artists who earn a higher wage will work fewer hours
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to learn new versions of software every few years)8. Therefore, work-
ing in a field characterized by a low erosion of the usage of particular
techniques renders a comparative advantage. However, this effect may
be countered by excessive entry of young talents who prefer to enter
a stable rather than a volatile field, just think of the many students
flocking to literature and political science. The parameter b captures
just the opposite to δ, in fact, only b− δ matters.
4. The bifurcation diagram in Fig. 3 w.r.t. the parameter m, which ac-
counts for disproportional returns to human capital (and thus, reflects
the Matthew effect, and the analysis of the corresponding optimal paths
in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show: i) the location of the Sisyphus point shrinks
as m grows; ii) the location of the upper saddle grows, but slowly, and
so does the domain of attraction. However, the first effect is stronger.
Indeed given the optimality of the high steady state the existence of
the Sisyphus points ensures that k → 0 is optimal for sufficiently low
endowments, at least for k0 < ks. Therefore, creators characterized
by a larger value of m are able to survive even if starting at relatively
low initial human capital. This outcome need not so much linked to
human capital itself but could arise from the ability to sell or market
one’s talent or to have access to networks and to large markets.
5. Parameter h accounts for non-monetary utilities. It accounts and ex-
plains why some artists really go for their topic even if that means
fighting for survival due to the lack of sufficient proceeds from their
work. If h is low (i.e., this intrinsic motivation is not too high), then
convergence to k = 0 is the only option, while for a sufficiently high
value of h it can be better to stay at the Sisyphus point.
6 Conclusions
We have formulated an intertemporal optimization problem about the career
decisions of an individual talent (in arts, sports or science) accounting for the
difficulty (more precisely, impossibility in our model) to take credit and the
convex returns to human capital that capture the Matthew effect observed in
different areas. The proposed model leads to multiple steady states and thus
8And that is why LATEX is so successful, to save brains on that.
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to thresholds due to a non-concave maximization problem. Only sufficiently
high initial values of human capital allow for convergence to the high (saddle
point) equilibrium. Therefore, whether one should pursue or stop depends
on initial conditions. The new and additional feature is the appearance of
a Sisyphus point, i.e., a point at which consumption is at the subsistence
level (c = 0), because all proceeds must be invested in order to avoid the
decline of human capital. And this point can be optimal (or not) and can
determine the threshold. Furthermore, this constraint affects the outcome
substantially: first, it eliminates otherwise feasible interior solutions; second,
even if it is optimal staying in business, then it determines investment (over
time and levels of human capital). This finding is in line with Caucutt and
Lochner (2020) who show in an entirely different context that (life-cycle)
borrowing constraints severely limit investments into human capital.
The model differs from previous socio-economic studies of thresholds by
the emergence of new and special properties at a point that we call a Sisyphus
point because it is associated with zero consumption. It can be optimal
to stay at this point forever if the intrinsic benefit (the parameter h) is
sufficiently large and it can serve as a threshold between attractors to leaving
(convergence to the origin of the state space) or to attaining a profitable
outcome in one’s profession. Therefore, Sisyphus points provide a sharp
differentiation about the different career prospects and how they depend on
initial human capital, e.g., in science after receiving a Ph.D. If the path to
k = 0 is the optimal (or the only viable) outcome for many, then it describes
the Matthew effect and explains why some never publish a paper and quit
science. This phenomenon is also observable in art (with teaching as an exit
option for painters and musicians), in sports (e.g., offering tennis or skiing
lessons after exiting) and for small businesses. The reason for this separation
of outcomes is as follows. The reward grows always at k2. The linear term
dominates the necessary investments for capital expansion (i.e., i > imin) at
small levels of k while the quadratic term for large values k (see Fig. 1).
An initial jump, k0 > ks, corresponds to the following situation, e.g.,
in research: a young researcher publishes a nice paper already prior to re-
ceiving the Ph.D., which helps at the post-graduate job market and thereby
reinforces further growth (e.g., landing at a famous institution).9 Those less
lucky, can choose between staying at their Sisyphus point or quitting (human
9However, things need not be that straightforward, because a recent article in The
Economist (2019) argues that “if at first you do not succeed, try, try, try again”.
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capital converges to zero). Indeed, many young scientists face this problem
and even relatively established scientists can temporarily find themselves in
a Sisyphus trap; such outcomes are even more frequent in art.
The model presented in this paper can be extended into many directions.
In terms of theory, a possible extension is for uncertainty (continuous as well
as jumps) due to the presence of luck, in particular, in art and also in science,
but less so in sports; another one is to try alternative formulations of both, the
objective and the dynamic constraint. In terms of applications, this or related
frameworks may provide insights into other fields and can lead to similar
complex dynamic patterns including the possibility of Sisyphus points. In
terms of economic policies, the existence of Sisyphus points can create socially
unfavorable outcomes if too many talents cannot finance investment into their
human capital due to credit constraints.
A Appendix
Sisyphus point as an abnormal solution
We will explain the concepts of normality and abnormality in optimization
problems. Therefore we start with a short excursion of a general finite di-
mensional constraint optimization problem, which in its simplest form writes
as
max
x∈R
f(x) (17a)
g(x) ≥ 0, (17b)
where f : Rn → R and g : Rn → Rm are continuously differentiable functions.
To identify a maximizer of problem (17) a necessary optimality condition is
the Kuhn-Tucker criterion (Kuhn and Tucker, 1950). Let x∗ be a maximizer
of problem (17) and let
L(x, λ) := f(x) + λ>g(x) (18a)
be the Lagrangian function, then there exists λ ∈ Rm satisfying
Lx(x
∗, λ) = 0 (18b)
λ>g(x∗) = 0 (18c)
λ ≥ 0. (18d)
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But in general, without any further assumptions, so called constraint qualifi-
cations, the conditions (18c)-(18d) may fail. For the formulation of necessary
optimality conditions without constraint qualifications conditions (18a)-(18d)
hold only for the extended Lagrangian
L(x, λ, λ0) := λ0f(x) + λ
>g(x). (19)
Due to the linearity of the Lagrangian in the Lagrange-multipliers (λ0, λ) we
can divide by λ0 if λ0 6= 0. Thus, two cases can be distinguished, where
either λ0 = 1 also called the normal case or λ0 = 0 the abnormal case.
The concepts of normality and abnormality of a problem also pass to
the infinite dimensional case of optimal control problems. Halkin (1974) for
example showed that for infinite time horizon problems with free end state
the problem may not be normal.
Next we derive the necessary optimality conditions for the active con-
straint mk2 + bk − i ≥ 0, Eq. (3). Therefore we consider the Lagrangian
L(k, i, λ, ν, λ0) = H(k, i, λ, λ0) + ν(mk
2 + bk − i) (20)
where H(k, i, λ, λ0) is the Hamiltonian (11). Then an optimal solution
(k∗(·), i∗(·)), with active constraint, has to satisfy
i∗(t) = i◦(k∗(t))
with
i◦(k) = mk2 + bk. (21)
The condition Li(k, i, λ, ν, λ0) = 0 yields the Lagrangian multiplier
ν(k, λ, λ0) = −λ0 + λ(1− 2a(mk2 + bk)). (22)
The canonical system writes as
k˙(t) = i◦(t)− ai◦(t)2 − δk(t) (23)
λ˙(t) = rλ− Lk(k(t), i◦(k(t)), λ(t), ν(k(t), λ(t), λ0), λ0)
= (r + δ)λ(t)− λ0(2k(t)m+ b+ h)−
ν(k(t), λ(t), λ0)(2mk(t) + b)
(24)
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together with the boundary conditions
k(0) = k0, and lim
t→∞
e−rtλ(t) = 0. (25)
Let λ(·) satisfy the canonical system Eqs. (23)–(25) at the optimal solution
(k∗(·), i∗(t)). Then additionally the Lagrangian multiplier has to satisfy the
complementary slackness condition
ν(k∗(t), λ(t), λ0)(mk∗(t)2 + bk∗(t)− i∗(t)) = 0
and the non-negativity condition
ν(k∗(t), λ(t), λ0) ≥ 0. (26)
Subsequently, we consider the solution behavior in the vicinity of the Sisyphus
point ks, see Fig. 3a. Therefore we analyze the properties of the correspond-
ing equilibrium (ks, λs) in the state-costate space with
λs =
h
r + δ − (b+ 2ksm)(1− 2aks(b+mks)) (27)
the zero of Eq. (24).
Then we can distinguish two different cases. Firstly, if (ks, λs) is an
unstable node and secondly where it is a saddle. In the bifurcation diagram
Fig. 3a the first case is depicted by a dashed (red) curve and the second case
is depicted by a dashed-dotted (red) line.
The Lagrange multiplier (26) evaluated at the equilibrium (ks, λs) is of
particular importance. For simplicity we consider the case where (ks, λs) is
a hyperbolic equilibrium of the canonical system Eqs. (23)–(24). An equilib-
rium is hyperbolic if no (real part of the) eigenvalue of the Jacobian, evaluated
at the equilibrium, is zero.
Proposition A1 Let (ks, λs) ∈ R2 be a hyperbolic equilibrium of the canon-
ical system Eqs. (23)–(24) and λ0 = 1. The equilibrium (ks, λs) is a saddle
iff the Lagrangian multiplier satisfies
ν(ks, λs, λ0) < 0. (28)
The eigenvalues ξ1,2 of the Jacobian at (ks, λs) are
ξ1 = (b+ 2ksm)(1− 2aks(b+mks))− δ > 0 (29)
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and
ξ2 = r + δ − (b+ 2ksm)(1− 2aks(b+mks)) < 0 (30)
and the eigenvector related to ξ2 is
v2 =
(
0
1
)
. (31)
Proof The Jacobian Js at (ks, λs) of the canonical system Eqs. (23)–(24) is
of the form
Js =
(
Γ(ks) 0
Ω(ks, λs) r − Γ(ks)
)
with
Γ(k) := (b+ 2km)(1− 2ak(b+mk))− δ.
The eigenvalues ξ1,2 and corresponding eigenvectors v1,2 of Js are
ξ1 = Γ(ks), ξ2 = r − Γ(ks)
v1 =

 rΩ(ks, λs)
1
 for Ω(ks, λs) 6= 0(
1
0
)
for Ω(ks, λs) = 0
(32)
v2 =
(
0
1
)
.
First we show that Γ(ks) > 0. Assume to the contrary that Γ(ks) < 0, then
r − Γ(ks) > 0 and (ks, λs) is a saddle. In that case we find that due to
Eq. (32) the stable path has a nonzero k component. Specifically, this means
that there exist k0 < ks and λ˜ such that the path (k(·), λ(·)) with k(0) = k0
and λ(0) = λ˜ satisfying the canonical system Eqs. (23)–(24) converge to
(ks, λs). Since k0 < ks this implies k˙ |k0> 0 contradicting the definition of
ks. Thus, we find Γ(ks) > 0.
Therefore, (ks, λs) is a saddle iff r−Γ(ks) < 0. Equation (6) implies that
imax(ks) = mk
2
s + bks <
1
2a
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and hence
1− 2a(mk2s + bks) > 0.
Using the expression of the equilibrium costate λs given by (27) and the
expression for the Lagrangian multiplier (22) we find. The expression r −
Γ(ks) < 0 iff λs < 0 and hence
ν(ks, λs, 1) = −1 + λs(1− 2a(mk2s + bks)) < 0.
This finishes the proof. 
Next, we define the optimized value function V ∗(·). Let
V (k(·), i(·)) :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt(mk(t)2 + bk(t)− i(t) + hk(t)) dt
then
V ∗(k0) := max
i(·)
V (k(·), i(·))
0 ≤ i(t) ≤ mk(t)2 + bk(t), t ≥ 0,
where k(·) and i(·) satisfy the state dynamics (2), is called the optimized
value function of problem (1)–(3).
We will also make use of the specific expression for the control value in
the interior of the control region given by Eq. (12) and therefore define
iint(λ) :=
λ− 1
2aλ
. (33)
Proposition A2 Let (k∗(·), i∗(·)) ≡ (ks, i◦(ks)) be the optimal solution for
problem (1)–(3) with k(0) = ks and let (ks, λs) be a hyperbolic node for λ0 = 1
and let
iint(λs) > i
max(ks). (34)
Then the problem is normal, i.e. λ0 = 1. Let V
∗(k) be the optimized value
function, then V ∗(·) is continuously differentiable in ks. Specifically it satis-
fies
lim
k→ks
∂
∂k
V ∗(k) = λs. (35)
27
Remark Property (34) states that the interior control value, given by the
term (34), is not admissible at the Sisyphus point ks.
Proof We make use of the following property for an optimal solution of
problem (1)–(3). Let
(k∗(k0, ·), i∗(k0, ·))
denote the optimal solution of problem (1)–(3) for k(0) = k0. Then the
following property holds
lim
k0→ks
(k∗(k0, ·), i∗(k0, ·)) = (k∗(ks, ·), i∗(ks, ·)) = (ks, imax(ks))
specifically, we have
lim
k0→ks
i∗(k0, 0) = imax(ks).
In the following we assume w.l.o.g. k0 ≥ ks. Two cases have to be distin-
guished
i∗(k0, 0) < imax(ks), k0 6= ks
or there exists a k¯ > ks such that
i∗(k0, 0)
{
< imax(ks) for k0 > k¯
= imax(ks) for ks ≤ k0 ≤ k¯.
The first case can be excluded due to assumption (34). Since in that case the
costate function λ(k0, ·) corresponding to the optimal solution for k(0) = k0
satisfies
lim
k0→ks
i∗(k0, 0) = lim
k0→ks
iint(λ(k0, 0)) = i
int(λs) = i
max(ks),
which violates assumption (34), iint(λs) > i
max(ks).
The second case implies that the costate function λ(k0, ·) satisfies the
adjoint equation (25) and hence
lim
k0→ks
λ(k0, ·) = λs,
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or using the relation of the costate and the optimal value function, ∂
∂k
V ∗(k) =
λ(k, 0)
lim
k→ks
∂
∂k
V ∗(k) = λs,
implying Eq. (35).
Moreover, we find that in the vicinity of ks the non-negativity of the
Lagrange multiplier (26) is fulfilled
ν(k0, λ(k0, 0), 1) ≥ 0, ks < k0 < k¯
and hence
lim
k0→ks
ν(k0, λ(k0, 0), 1) = ν(ks, λs, 1) ≥ 0,
proving that (ks, λs) satisfies the necessary optimality conditions for λ0 = 1
and hence the problem is normal. This finishes the proof. 
If the Sisyphus point and the related control are the optimal equilibrium
solution but (ks, λs) is a saddle the following proposition holds.
Proposition A3 Let (k∗(·), i∗(·)) ≡ (ks, i◦(ks)) be the optimal solution for
problem (1)–(3) with k(0) = ks and let (ks, λs) be a saddle for λ0 = 1. Then
the problem is abnormal i.e. λ0 = 0.
Let V ∗(k) with |k− ks| < ε be the optimized value function, then V ∗(·) is
not Lipschitz continuous in ks. Specifically it satisfies
lim
k→ks,k 6=ks
∂
∂k
V ∗(k) =∞. (36)
For λ0 = 0 the point (ks, 0) is a saddle of the canonical system Eqs. (23)–
(24).
Proof Repeating the first part of the proof of Prop. A2 we find the two cases
an optimal solution in the vicinity of ks can satisfy
i∗(k0, 0)
{
< imax(ks) for k0 > ks
= imax(ks) for k0 ≤ ks.
29
The first case
i∗(k0, 0) < imax(ks), k0 6= ks (37)
can be excluded. Since in Prop. A1 we showed that if (ks, λs) is a saddle,
the Lagrange multiplier is negative. But from Eq. (37) and the slackness
condition it follows that
ν(k0, λ(k0, 0), 1) = 0
and hence
lim
k0→ks
ν(k0, λ(k0, 0), 1) = ν(ks, λs, 1) = 0
which violates
ν(ks, λs, 1) < 0.
For this argument we used the continuity of the Lagrange multiplier, which
is a result of the uniqueness of the control value in the Hamilton maximizing
condition
i∗(t) = argmaxH(k∗(t), i, λ(t), λ0), with 0 ≤ i ≤ mk∗(t)2 + bk∗(t).
Thus, in the neighborhood of ks the costate functions λ(k0, ·) satisfy the
adjoint equation (24) and due to the properties of the saddle (ks, λs) derived
in Prop. A1 we find
lim
k0→ks
λ(k0, 0) =∞,
or using the relation of the costate and the optimal value function, ∂
∂k
V ∗(k) =
λ(k, 0)
lim
k→ks
∂
∂k
V ∗(k) =∞,
which implies that the optimal objective value is not Lipschitz continuous in
ks.
To prove the abnormality of the problem we first state that (ks, λs) do
not satisfy the necessary optimality conditions, since the Lagrange multiplier
is negative. Assume that we choose some λ(ks, 0) such that
ν(ks, λ(ks, 0), 1) ≥ 0.
30
Since {(ks, λ) : λ ∈ R} is the stable manifold of (ks, λs) this implies the
existence of some time τ(λ(0)) such that for all t > τ(λ(0)) the Lagrange
multiplier evaluated at the costate function λ(ks, ·) fulfills
ν(ks, λ(ks, t), 1) < 0
and hence violates the necessary optimality conditions. Consequently the
necessary optimality conditions for the optimal solution (ks, i
max(ks)) are
only satisfied for λ0 = 0 and therefore the problem is abnormal.
Setting λ0 = 0 we find that (ks, 0) is a saddle of the canonical system
and hence for every initial λ(0) > 0 the necessary optimality conditions are
satisfied, specifically
(λ(·), λ0) 6= 0.
This finishes the proof. 
Remark An interpretation of abnormality of the problem in the Sisyphus
point in economic terms can be the following. In the Sisyphus point the
optimal control is on the edge. There is no other possibility than to choose
imax(ks) and the slightest change in the state value yields a sharp (infinite)
relative increase/decrease in the optimal profit.
In our numerical examples presented in Sec. 5.1 there is a small region
m ∈ (0.0352 . . . , 0.0353 . . .), where (ks, λs) is an unstable node and Prop. A2
applies, see Fig. A.1a. For parameter values m > 0.0353 . . . the equilibrium
(ks, λs) is a saddle and Prop. A3 applies, see Fig. A.1b.
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(a) m = 0.036 (b) m = 0.05
Figure A.1: In panel (a) the equilibrium (ks, λs) is an unstable node (see
Prop. A2) and the problem for k(0) = ks is normal. In panel (b) the equi-
librium (ks, λs) is a saddle (see Prop. A3) and the problem for k(0) = ks is
abnormal. The parameter values are taken from (16).
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